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Abstract
As nations economically prosper, do future generations undergo a steady shift in
values? This thesis seeks to analyze the Post-World War II intergenerational shift in Japanese
attitudes toward Japanese women and the LGBT, multiethnic, and indigenous communities.
Centered around Ronald Inglehart's "Materialist" and "Post-Materialist" theories, this
research seeks to contribute to current literature surrounding the development of
contemporary Japanese values. Inglehart's "Materialist" theory consists of the idea that
individuals pursued various goals in hierarchical order with their base necessities such as
sustenance and safety gaining priority. After their base necessities are satisfied, Inglehart
believed that people's values shifted, emphasizing belonging, self-expression, and quality of
life, all considered "Post-Materialist" values. This thesis utilizes empirical data and
qualitative materials to analyze the shift in Japanese views surrounding gender, sexual, and
ethnic minorities. This thesis found that Inglehart’s Post-Materialist value change and
intergenerational shift were present in views toward women and the LGBT community while
views toward the Hafu and Ainu may be backsliding.
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Introduction
As nations economically prosper, do future generations undergo a steady shift in
values? This thesis seeks to analyze the Post-World War II intergenerational shift in Japanese
attitudes toward Japanese women and the LGBT, multiethnic, and indigenous communities.
Utilizing Ronald Inglehart's (1971) Materialist and Post-Materialist theories as the theoretical
framework, this research seeks to contribute to the current literature surrounding value
change theory in Japan.
Inglehart's Materialist and Post-Materialist theories are based upon the idea that
individuals prioritize their needs in hierarchical order. These materialistic values include
security, shelter, and order. On the other hand, Inglehart speculated that after economic
security is met, the future generations within a nation undergo a steady shift in values,
emphasizing Post-Materialist ideals like self-expression and equality. These values are
considered Post-Materialist due to their emphasis on non-material goals.
Due to Japan's fascinating history as Asia's first major power after their "miraculous"
Post-World War II industrialization, one would believe that Japan's societal values would
have changed as swiftly as their economy. Research relating to views toward
underrepresented minorities groups in Japan is essential to understanding possible policy
changes and movements in the future. Thus, this thesis utilizes empirical data from the World
Values Survey (WVS), Gender Gap Report, and Japanese governmental statistics and
qualitative materials to analyze the Post-World War II shift in Japanese views surrounding
gender, sexual, and ethnic minorities.
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Literature Review
Inglehart’s Post-Materialist Theory
Coining the terms "Materialism" and "Post-Materialism" by analyzing post-industrial
societies, Inglehart (1971) theorized that a gradual shift in values occurred through the
generations. Inglehart's (1971) thesis centered around "Materialism," the idea that individuals
pursued various goals in hierarchical order with their base necessities such as sustenance and
safety gaining priority. After their base necessities are satisfied, Inglehart (1971) stated that
people's values shifted, emphasizing belonging, self-expression, and quality of life, all
considered "Post-Materialist" values. The Post-Materialist theory's basis comes from
Inglehart's (1981) Socialization and Scarcity hypotheses. To test this theory, Inglehart (1971)
used empirical data, focusing on Western European countries. His findings concluded that an
intergenerational change associated with higher economic growth was evident in several
European nations, with Great Britain’s industrialization occurring the earliest (Inglehart
1971). As the literature surrounding Materialism and Post-Materialism grew, the theories
gained traction with other researchers, and Inglehart and colleagues expanded their
geographical analysis to include non-Western nations. As a result, a large portion of
Inglehart's (1981) research utilized Japan, a nation known for its "miracle" economic growth
during the post-World War II era. This section explores Inglehart's Socialization and Scarcity
hypotheses within the Post-Materialist Theory's context to analyze the value changes in
Japan.
Scarcity and Socialization Hypotheses
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Inglehart (1981) defines the theoretical framework for his Post-Materialist theory
within the Socialization and Scarcity hypotheses. Inglehart (1981) describes the Scarcity
hypothesis as "an individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places
the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply (Inglehart
1981, 881).
However, the Scarcity hypothesis notes that during periods of economic wealth, PostMaterialist values such as equality and self-expression are expected to be more prevalent
than Materialist values such as order and economic stability. A nation’s economic decline
caused the opposite effect, Materialist values rose while the prominence of Post-Materialist
values fell. However, due to the Socialization hypothesis, Inglehart (1981) stated that there
was not a one-to-one relationship between economic prosperity and the prominence of
Materialist or Post-Materialist values. Because these values do not consider social factors
such as one's cultural setting, the Scarcity hypothesis alone cannot make predictions about
value changes. Subsequently, the article defines the Socialization hypothesis as,
“The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one
of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved, for, to a large extent, one's basic
values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years” (Inglehart 1981,
881).
By utilizing the Scarcity and Socialization hypotheses in conjunction, one can
generate accurate predictions about the value change in a nation's generational shift of values
(Inglehart 1981).
Post-Materialist Theory and Japan
Following Inglehart's (1997) book that created a fleshed-out version of the Materialist
and Post-Materialist value systems by surveying over forty countries, Taniguchi (2006)
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summarized the differences between the value systems (see Table 1). Utilizing questions (see
Table 2) from Inglehart's (1997) theory, Taniguchi (2006) applies Inglehart's Post-Materialist
theory to trace the rise of Post-Materialism in Japan through newspaper editorials within the
popular Asahi Shimbum. With the circulation of the Asahi Shimbun being over 8 million and
known to reflect public values through repeated yearly questions, Taniguchi (2006) gathered
enough data to determine Inglehart's (1971) correlation between economic development and
an intergenerational change in values to be present within Japan. Examining 33,479 Japanese
newspapers from August 1945 to December 2000, Taniguchi (2006) traced the long-term
effects of economic development on Japanese values concerning historical issues and
external factors such as inflation and crime.
Similar research by Ike (1973) and Trommsdorff (1983) called into question the
applicability of Western-focused analyses to non-Western nations. Trommsdorff (1983) and
Ike (1973) utilized the same Japanese National Character Survey data, taken in five-year
intervals, to analyze the development in Japanese values. The Japanese National Character
Survey began in 1953 and questioned a differing number of participants each time, ranging
from around 1,500 participants in 1958 to over 3,000 in 1968 (Ike 1973). As noted by both
Ike (1973) and Trommsdorff (1983), the results of their articles were less clear than
Inglehart's (1971) study of Western Europe. Ike (1973) noted that intergenerational, life
cycle, and adult changes were visible. Still, one may question the length of time needed to
accurately surmise a generational shift, as shown in Ike (1973) and Trommsdorff's (1983)
articles.
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Unlike Taniguchi's (2006) study with fixed yearly observations, Trommsdorff (1983)
and Ike (1973) utilized data that may not have correlated with Inglehart's (1971) original
theory due to the length of time between surveys. Furthermore, Taniguchi notes that
Materialist values began to loosen in the 1960s, with Post-Materialist values rising after the
1980s, after the end of Ike's (1973) and Trommsdorff's (1983) studies. Notably, unlike Ike
(1973), Trommsdorff's (1983) study considered the value differences between the East and
West with Japanese survey data cross-referenced with German and American data. Through
these efforts, Trommsdorff (1983) noted that a clear value change pattern based on Western
values was difficult to detect in Japan. Thus, despite Inglehart’s (1971) theories’ applicability
to Japan being questioned, the noticeable developments after the 1960s s indicate that there
are thought provoking developments for future study surrounding the Materialist to PostMaterialist shift.
Post Materialism and Japanese Women
The World Economic Forum's 2021 Global Gender Gap Report (GGR) mapped
gender parity across 153 nation-states. The GGR focused on economic participation and
opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment (World
Economic Forum 2021). These benchmarks allowed for researchers to compare the studied
nations and across different regions. In the 2021 report (Figure 1), Japan ranked 120th, sliding
up 1 place from the prior year but falling 41 places from the original GGR in 2006 (World
Economic Forum 2020, 2021). This chapter analyzes the areas of the World Economic
Forum's GGR and Japan's current status on gender equality.
Economic Participation and Opportunity
5

Placed at 117th out of 153 nations, Japan ranked incredibly low in women's economic
participation and opportunity (World Economic Forum 2021; Yamaguchi 2019). Yamaguchi
(2019) noted that one of the vital causes for Japan's low ranking is the large gender wage
gap. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD)
data, Japan currently has the second-largest gender wage gap of all OECD nations at 23.5%
second only to South Korea’s gender wage gap of over 30%.
Takenoshita (2020) discussed gender inequality within Japan's labor market; long and
frequent overtime hours cause problems for married women with children. As a result of
strict gender roles affecting their careers, women are typically expected to quit their jobs
after marriage or childbirth while men undertake the sole breadwinner's role (Takenoshita
2020). Additionally, Japanese women’s ability to climb into senior positions has also been
negatively affected by traditional gender roles. In Japan, only 14.7% of managerial or senior
positions are held by women, compared to the U.S. which stands at 42% (World Economic
Forum 2021). Thus, the perpetuation of stereotypical gender roles feeds into the everwidening gender wage gap and workplace gender gap in Japan, causing Japan's low
placement in the women's economic involvement category.
Educational Attainment
Comparatively, Japan scored a lot better in educational attainment, placing 92nd out of
153 nations (World Economic Forum 2021). Akabayashi et al.'s (2020) study noted that
gender bias existed within educational expectations in Japanese society, with families
typically pushing their sons to achieve university rather than their daughters. Due to an
expectation of future financial security from a son and the notable gender difference in the
6

value of striving for higher education, Akabayashi et al. (2020) stated that these reasons
mentioned above led to the gender gap within educational attainment. Furthermore, the
gender discrimination faced by women in the labor market typically forces families to
believe that the advantage in the marriage market for educated women is less than for an
educated man (Akabayashi et al. 2020). Much like the last category, traditional gender roles
affect societal views on women's educational goals, leading to the low placement in
educational attainment.
Health and Survival
Japan held its highest GGR rank in women's health and survival at 65th out of 153
(World Economic Forum 2021). Although scoring very highly in women's health due to
placing first in the birth sex ratio and women's long-life expectancy, Japan fell behind in
other areas that lowered its overall score (World Economic Forum 2021). The prevalence of
gender-based violence and limited access to abortions lowered Japan's women's health and
survival score.
According to the World Health Organization's (2020) Global Abortion Policies
Database, Japan's 1907 Penal Code (also called Law No. 45) and 1948 Maternal Health
Guide only allow abortion for select reasons. Consequently, abortions are only available
under instances that threaten the mother's health, economic insecurity, and pregnancies
resulting from sexual assault. Thus, safe and legal abortions are not available to women
whose pregnancies fall outside of the aforementioned three categories of exceptions. (World
Health Organization 2020). On the other hand, sexual harassment and other forms of genderbased violence are rampant within the nation (Dalton 2017). Dalton's (2017) article
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exemplified the sexual harassment faced by women in Japan as she studied the harassment
that three 2016 female politicians faced. Japan's high ranking in the health and survival
category is puzzling due to the prevalence of violence against women.
Political Empowerment
Finally, ranking the worst in women's political empowerment, Japan ranked 147th out
of 153 (World Economic Forum 2021). As the nation held one of the lowest percentages of
female parliamentarians and ministers at barely 10% each, Japan's political representation of
women is abysmal (World Economic Forum 2020). Japan's percentage of women in
parliament is 20% below the average in other advanced nations (World Economic Forum
2020). Moreover, Japan has never had a female prime minister, and the then Prime Minister
Abe's cabinet only held one position filled by a woman (World Economic Forum 2020). The
lack of female representation in Japanese politics is the chief contribution to the nation's
current status as one of the advanced nations with one of the largest gender gaps. Overall,
Japan's placement in this section is entirely explainable due to the lack of women's
representation or empowerment in government.
Overall, the World Economic Forum's (2020) findings showed that Japan's progress
toward gender equality is not only unsatisfactory but consistently backsliding. As a result,
traditional Japanese gender roles have affected several areas of society, resulting in Japan’s
low placement on the list. Despite a push for women's involvement in various areas of the
economy by former Prime Minister Abe dubbed "Abenomics" and "Womenomics," the plans
were neither coordinated nor pursued fervently (Lincoln 2020). Thus, for gender equitable
attitudes to translate into policy in Japan more federal level policies are necessary.
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Post Materialism and the LGBT Community
Since 1981, Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues’ World Values Surveys have
analyzed the acceptance of the LGBT community in Japan (World Values Survey 2020). The
survey, conducted from 1981 to 1984, showed that 72% of Japanese people had “low”
acceptance for the LGBT community, while only 4% responded that they had “high”
acceptance (World Values Survey 2020). On the other hand, the most recent survey,
conducted from 2017 to 2020, showed that Japanese values shifted, with 17% of respondents
answering “low” and 55% answering “high” (World Values Survey 2020).
However, despite the surveyed acceptance of the LGBT community increasing, this
shift has yet to be reflected in current policies. Policies relating to the LGBT community
include the struggle for same-sex marriage recognition and transgender Japanese people’s
recognition being tied to sterilization upon undergoing gender reassignment surgery. Thus,
this chapter examines the current views and discrimination that the Japanese LGBT
community faces despite the shifting values in Japanese society. Also, this section discusses
possible future policy changes for the LGBT community.
“Gay Friendly” Japan
Scholar Masami Tamagawa (2016) stated that Japanese morality and the
consideration of LGBT individuals going against “public order” may have led to low
acceptance levels. However, Tamagawa discussed Japan’s stereotypes as a “gay and lesbian
friendly” nation from several historical and cultural perspectives. First, the nation lacked
Christian roots, and the anti-LGBT sentiment in the form of religious guilt in the West has
never formed (Tamagawa 2016). Second, since Japan has never implemented anti-LGBT
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laws, the systemic police harassment and religious persecution seen in nations that
criminalize the LGBT community were not present in Japan. (Tamagawa 2016). Third,
Japan’s history has many examples of gay relationships in Edo art and literature, such as
cross-gender performances within Kabuki and the Takarazuka Revue (Tamagawa 2016).
Policies and Discrimination toward Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals (LGB)
Although same-sex marriage is not prohibited in Japan, Article 24 of the Constitution
and Book IV of the Civil Code outlined the marriage laws, stating that, “Marriage shall be
based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis” (Tamagawa 2016, 165).
Because most Japanese legal scholars interpret the phrase “both sexes” to be men and
women, marriage in Japan is exclusively for heterosexual couples (Tamagawa 2016).
Furthermore, same-sex partners who have cohabited for many years cannot be deemed
married as a “common law marriage,” a right granted to opposite-sex partners who have
cohabitated for the same number of years (Tamagawa 2016). Despite these legal restraints, in
2009, the Japanese government announced that Japanese citizens who married a foreign
partner of the same sex could receive marriage eligibility forms.
Policies and Discrimination toward Transgender Individuals
Transgender rights in Japan have been associated with the stereotypes that individuals
are “trapped in the wrong body” or that all transgender individuals align themselves with the
binary sexes of “female” or “male” (Mclelland 2004). Furthermore, because the transgender
identity has long been classified as a mental health disorder, Japan requires transgender
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individuals to be diagnosed with “Gender Identity Disorder” from a medical professional
(Mclelland and Suganuma 2009).
Legislative changes in 1997 finally allowed doctors to perform gender reassignment
surgery, but this procedure was limited to transgender individuals diagnosed with Gender
Identity Disorder (Mclelland and Suganuma 2009). In 2004, the Special Law on Gender
Identity Disorder was passed, stating that transgender individuals could change their gender
legally; however, this process came with restrictive and far-reaching requirements (Human
Rights Watch 2019; Tamagawa 2016; Mclelland and Suganuma 2009). Gender reassignment
surgery requires that transgender individuals undergo sterilization, and those who are married
or have underage children are ineligible to legally change their gender (Human Rights Watch
2019; Tamagawa 2016; Mclelland and Suganuma 2009).
Future Policies for the LGBT Community
Movements to legalize same-sex marriage and ban the sterilization of transgender
individuals have reached the Japanese Supreme Court, ending with different verdicts (Doi
and Knight 2019; Human Rights Watch 2021). In January 2019, the Supreme Court upheld
the sterilization law, stating that “it was not appropriate for an individual to maintain the
reproductive capabilities of their previous gender” (Doi and Knight 2019). In March 2021,
the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that the ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional,
paving the way for the legalization of same-sex marriage federally (Human Rights Watch
2021).
Despite the removal of Gender Identity Disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) and the International Classifications of Diseases (ICD), Japan still requires
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forced sterilization for transgender individuals to receive legal recognition (Doi and Knight
2019). Thus, revising the GID Special Cases Act and GID’s removal as a mental disorder is
the next crucial step for transgender rights in Japan.
After garnering over 100,000 signatures, J-ALL, Athlete Ally, All Out, and Human
Rights Watch submitted a petition asking the Diet to create an LGBT Equality Act that
would prohibit discrimination based on sexual or gender identity (Human Rights Watch
2021). As the current political focus lies on same-sex marriage legalization and the Equality
Act, these laws may take the spotlight in the coming months before the Tokyo Olympics.
However, the journey for LGBT rights in Japan is an ongoing struggle to achieve equality
throughout the community, not just for some.
Post-Materialism and the Multiethnic Japanese Community
Characterized as one of the world’s most ethnically, linguistically, and culturally
homogenous nations, many believe that Japan lacks diversity (Yamashiro 2013). Contrary to
this belief, Japan is home to a few minorities, including a growing population of multiracial
or Hafu individuals (Yamashiro 2013). Despite the increasing presence of Hafu, the concepts
of race and ethnicity are complicated as the idea of Nihonjinron or “Japaneseness” created a
cultural and nationalistic identity separating groups not classified as “pure Japanese”
(Kimura 2020). Inglehart’s (1971) Post-Materialist Theory stated that as nations grew
economically, the future generations tended to place more importance on values such as
diversity and personal expression. In tandem with Inglehart’s (1971) Post-Materialist Theory,
since World War II, Japanese society has grown more open to diversity with the increased
visibility of mixed-race individuals. This chapter examines the increasing prevalence of
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mixed-race individuals in Japan and the evolution of terminology toward mixed-race
Japanese in the context of Nihonjinron.
Nihonjinron and Materialism
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) stated that societies that emphasize Materialism hold a
heightened national pride and nationalistic views that may border on xenophobia. As a result,
these societies tend to be less tolerant of cultural diversity, which is rooted in the idea that
foreigners threaten their nation’s security (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Conversely, as
societies modernize and emphasize Post-Materialist values such as freedom and selfexpression, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) asserted that ethnic and cultural diversity become
more acceptable and encouraged. Following this example, Materialism in Japan showed
through the prominence of Nihonjinron. Nihonjinron gained distinction in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries to highlight the separation of Japanese traditions from Chinese
culture (Kimura 2020). One of the core tenets of Nihonjinron is the belief that Japan is a
racially homogenous and unified nation with a “genuine” Japanese identity, specifically
excluding minorities and Japan’s indigenous peoples (Liddicoat 2007; Kimura 2020). Thus,
as Japanese citizens shift to value Post-Materialist ideals, how will the propagation group
identity through Nihonjinron change?
The Evolution of Terminology for Multiethnic Japanese
A notable example of the changing views toward multiethnic peoples in Japan lies in
the changing language used to refer to the group since the 1940s (Yamashiro 2013). During
Post-World War II, the American occupation of Japan led to an increase of multiethnic
children born (Yamashiro 2013). However, due to the Japanese societal categorization of
multiethnic children as the “abandoned” product of U.S. soldiers and Japanese women, the
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terms used to racialize this group was mostly pejorative (Yamashiro 2013). The
terms konketsuji (mixed-blood children) and ainoko (child-in-between) were both derogatory
terms used to refer to the multiethnic children born during the post-war period (Yamashiro
2013; Törngren and Sato 2019). The late 1960s brought a change to the view toward
multiethnic Japanese, as there was an increase in the prevalence of multiethnic celebrities,
models, and idol groups (Iwabuchi 2014). In turn, the terminology for the multiethnic
community changed, abandoning the terms with negative connotations. (Iwabuchi 2014). The
term Hafu (half) came into use, becoming the contemporary term for multiethnic Japanese
(Iwabuchi 2014). Also, there are a couple less commonly used terms, daboru (double)
and mikkutsu (mixed) (Yamashiro 2013).
Contemporary Views and Representation of Multiethnic Japanese
According to Iwabuchi (2014), one of the factors that led to an increase in visibility
for the multiethnic community was an increase in international marriages, as well as a change
to the Japanese Nationality Law. In 1985, Japanese lawmakers revised the Nationality Law
and allowed individuals to claim Japanese citizenship by birth even if only the child’s mother
is a Japanese citizen (Murazumi 2000; Iwabuchi 2014). In addition, after World War II,
Japanese globalization increased as the nation underwent an “economic miracle” to become a
major power wholly integrated into the world economy. As a result, the 1990s were a period
in which Japan enjoyed increasing globalized society, leading to multiethnic Japanese
considered “trendy” and “worldly” (Yamashiro 2013). Notably, this change in mindset
toward the multiethnic children shifted the terms referring to multiethnic Japanese, and the
visibility of this minority group increased (Yamashiro 2013).
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In 2015, Ariana Miyamoto was nominated as Miss Universe Japan and later
represented Japan at the Miss Universe Pageant held in the United States (Kimura 2020).
Born to a Japanese mother and an African-American father, Miyamoto represented
the Hafu community (Kimura 2020). Miyamoto’s nomination was not without backlash;
online reactions questioned the validity of recognizing a mixed-race Japanese woman to
represent the nation. However, Miyamoto met her critics by stating that she would use her
platform to discuss racial discrimination in Japan as the first Black Japanese Miss Universe
(Kimura 2020, 1). Another mixed-race Japanese celebrity that recently gained popularity was
the tennis star Naomi Osaka. Osaka was born to a Japanese mother and Haitian father. Osaka
also faced a public backlash after addressing racism against Black people worldwide during
the Black Lives Matter protests. This analysis of Nihonjinron and the colloquial terms for
multiethnic Japanese demonstrated that the concept of “group identity” is still deeply
ingrained into Japanese society. Thus, despite the rise in globalization and visibility of
famous multiethnic Japanese individuals, acceptance of the group may still be lacking.
Post Materialism and the Ainu
Despite the stereotype that Japan is an ethnically homogenous nation, it is home to an
internationally recognized indigenous group called the Ainu. However, this group was not
always recognized within Japan, as the Ainu's systemic oppression was the norm after the
Meiji Restoration in 1868 (Siripala 2020). The change in ideas that came with the Meiji reign
created a state that emphasized the ties of the "Yamato" or ethnically Japanese to differentiate
from the people that they dubbed "backward," such as the indigenous Hokkaido Ainu and
Okinawan Ryuukyuans (Siddle 2003). Since 2019, the Japanese government has attempted to
15

recognize the importance of the Ainu; despite this effort, there is still work needed for the
Ainu community. Thus, this chapter examines the historical subjugation of the Ainu and
policies toward the group.
Historically Oppressive Policies Against the Ainu
Repressive policies against the Ainu began shortly after Japan's return to imperial rule
with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The creation of the ethnic divide between the "Yamato
Minzoku" and the "other" devised a sense of racial unity of the majority in Japan (Siripala
2020). The Ainu faced systemic forced subjugation, assimilation, and discrimination at the
hands of the Wajin, the Ainu term for ethnic Japanese. The first policy came with The Census
Registration Act of 1871, which forced the Ainu to take Japanese last names (Siripala 2020).
Next, in 1872, the largely Ainu lands in Hokkaido and the Sakhalin islands were seized by
the Japanese government and nationalized, pushing the Ainu off the land that they inhabited
and into poverty (Siddle 2003). Then, by 1876, Ainu customs and traditions such as tattoos,
earrings, and even Ainu homes were dubbed "backward" and banned by the Japanese
(Siripala 2020).
The most heinous colonial policies against the Ainu were the Hokkaido Former
Aborigines Protection Act of 1899 and the 1899 Asahikawa Ex-Aborigines Protection Land
Disposition Act, which directly fed into the systemic subjugation and poverty that the Ainu
faced then and the remnants of today (Osakada 2020; Siripala 2020; Michaud 2015; Siddle
2003). The Former Aborigines Act created a series of government measures meant to
"civilize" and "Japanize" the Ainu by erasing their identity with bans on the Ainu language
and culture (Siripala 2020). Also, this Act forced the relocation of many Ainu to government-
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designated farms, relegating them to agricultural careers on typically non-arable land,
as Yamato Japanese were given the most fertile plots of land first (Siripala 2020). Cultural
forms of subsistence practices that the Ainu used in Hokkaido, such as hunting and fishing,
were also banned by the Act, forcing the Ainu to be a cheap labor source for Japan (Siripala
2020). Finally, indoctrination of the Ainu children with "national ethics" and Japanese
language schooling were also critical parts of the Former Aborigines Act that also helped
erase the Ainu identity (Siripala 2020).
Ainu Activism and Repealing the Former Aborigines Protection Act
Ainu activism rose in the late 1960s with the creation of prominent organizations
such as the Hokkaido Utari Association that pushed for the repeal of the 1899 Former
Aborigines Protection Act (Osakada 2020; Siripala 2020; Siddle 2003). The Former
Aborigines Act lasted until 1997 when activists’ efforts paid off, and the Japanese
government repealed the Former Aborigines Act, replacing it with the "Law for the
Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of
the Ainu and the Ainu Culture" or "Ainu Promotion Law" (Osakada 2020). Although the
Ainu Promotion Law did not legally recognize the Ainu as an indigenous group of Japan, it
was a colossal step for the cultural promotion of the Ainu in Hokkaido (Osakada 2020). The
University of Minnesota's Human Rights Library (2021) described the contents of the Ainu
Promotion Law. The Ainu Promotion Law notably states that it
aims to realize the society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu people is respected and to
contribute to the development of diverse cultures in our country, by the implementation of
the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture (hereafter called "Ainu Traditions"), the
spread of knowledge related to Ainu Traditions, and the education of the nation, referring to
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the situation of Ainu traditions and culture from which the Ainu people find their ethnic pride
(University of Minnesota 2021).
However, despite the Ainu Promotion Law being monumental for the cultural promotion and
recognition of Ainu culture federally, the Ainu Promotion Law did not legally recognize the
Ainu as an indigenous group of Japan and instead focused on the traditional cultural aspects
of the Ainu (Osakada 2020; Siddle 2003). Japan would not federally declare the Ainu an
official indigenous group of Japan until a 2008 joint declaration (Library of Congress 2008).
Contemporary Ainu Policy
The Japanese government did not recognize the Ainu as an indigenous group until
2019 with the creation of a new Ainu law called the "Act on the Promotion of Measures to
Realise a Society Where the Pride of Ainu Is Respected" (Osakada 2020; Siripala 2020). The
Ainu Policy Act outlawed discrimination of the Ainu and created national and municipalitylevel publicity and educational organizations (Osakada 2020). Another critical part of the
Ainu Policy Act gave government grants to regions that planned projects promoting Ainu
traditions, culture, industry, and tourism (Osakada 2020; Siripala 2020). However, Ainu
communities were split on their view of the Act; some viewed it as a step in the right
direction, while others stated that it does not specify any indigenous rights. The Vice Director
of the Ainu Association of Hokkaido, Kazushi Abe, who reviewed the Act, stated that
The former law, the ACPA, applied only to Hokkaido based on the Cabinet order (the
ACPA Article 6). By contrast, this new Act targets nation-wide, which made me support it at
the Council for Ainu Policy Promotion (CAPP). However, it does not mean this is enough. It
does not stipulate our right to self-determination, right to lands, and right to social security.
The Act must be reviewed to protect these rights in the future (Osakada 2020).
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Overall, the Ainu Policy Act did not make any efforts to redistribute ancestral lands
to the Ainu nor guarantee any specific rights to the group. Although the Act created a new
Ainu museum dubbed Upopoy National Ainu Museum and Park, discrimination from
members of the Diet and far-right groups such as Nippon Kaigi may detriment further policy
movement for the Ainu community (Siripala 2020). Therefore, to fully protect and promote
the Ainu heritage and culture politically, there must be heightened public understanding and
representation of the Ainu (Osakada 2020). Thus, the current policy measures for the Ainu,
albeit a step forward, are insufficient for the proper protection and recognition of the Ainu.
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Methodology
This thesis utilized the information gained from the current literature surrounding
Materialism and Post-Materialist value change theories to create visual interpretations of the
data from the World Values Survey (WVS). Any "Missing" or "Don't Know" values were
excluded from graphed data for accuracy and ease of understanding. Survey questions
relating to gender and sexual minorities were analyzed and graphed by respondents’ answers
during the corelating WVS survey waves by using Microsoft Excel. Finally, the
aforementioned questions were also cross analyzed by the respondent’s age cohort (up to 29,
30 to 49, and over 50) to surmise the possibility of an intergenerational change in values.
Despite questions relating to the acceptance of racial diversity and respondents’
ethnicity being included within the WVS, these questions were not asked in Japan, so there is
no WVS time-series data related to the Ainu or Hafu. Thus, a combination of qualitative
analyses on the Multiracial Japanese population and available census data will be utilized
while quantitative studies on the Ainu will also be analyzed. Overall, with the World Values
Survey and other Japanese survey data, this thesis intends to model Inglehart’s theories and
test the applicability of the Post-Materialist and the generational replacement theories in
Japan.
The World Values Survey (WVS)
The World Values Survey (WVS) (2020) is an online data repository for collecting a
time series inquiry into human values and value changes across the globe. Inglehart and a
network of social scientists began the WVS (2020) in 1981, with the contemporary version of
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the survey being standardized and administered in almost 100 countries. The WVS (2020)
spans almost 100 nations using a standardized questionnaire to create the most significant
international inquiry into human beliefs, covering industrialized nations and less-developed
nations. Thus, the WVS (2020) is genuinely representative of the world’s population due to
the breadth and scope of the survey and interviews.
Within the context of the Post-Materialist hypothesis utilized in this research,
Inglehart’s empirical analysis in the WVS (2020) was used to surmise the possibility of a
gradual shift in acceptance of the LGBT community, and traditional gender role attitudes in
Japan in opinions relating to education and political leadership. In addition, this research
seeks to answer the hypothesis’ question, "as nations economically prosper, do they undergo
a steady change in values due to generational replacement and Inglehart's (1971) Materialism
to Post-Materialist shift theory?"
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The Acceptance of Homosexuality in Japan from 1981 to 2020
Utilizing Inglehart's (1971) Materialism and Post-Materialism as the theoretical
framework, this section investigates the change in the level of acceptance of the LGBT
community in Japan. In the WVS (2020), each wave asked respondents, “Please tell me for
each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between,” in all waves, Homosexuality was listed as one of the
prompts. This investigation uses Welzel’s data on the acceptance of the LGBT community,
dubbed “I_HOMOLIB” in the WVS. I_HOMOLIB utilizes the answers from respondents’
justification level of homosexuality to measure the level of acceptance into, "High, Medium,"
or "Low."
The survey collected data in seven different waves, with the initial being from 1981
to 1984. The subsequent six waves of the collection period for the WVS were conducted in
Japan in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2019, respectively. Due to the regular intervals
of data collection and public availability, the data were compiled and visualized using
Microsoft Excel to create Figures 2 through 5. Although all Figures do not include the total
9,523 missing responses from all the survey collection years, the data shown in the figures
represent those who successfully answered the survey.
According to Figure 2., in 1981, 72% of respondents stated that they held "Low"
acceptance of homosexuality, while 4% responded that they had "High" acceptance. On the
other hand, in the 2020 survey, only 17% of respondents answered "Low," while 55%
answered "High." As seen in Figure 2., the percentage of respondents holding “High”
acceptance of the LGBT community is steadily rising while those having “Low” acceptance
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was falling rapidly. Furthermore, the percentage of respondents that answered "Medium" has
been steady over all the WVS survey waves, which suggests a steady change toward PostMaterialist values. When dividing respondent’s responses by age cohort, up to 29, 30 to 49,
and 50 and above, respectfully, the results are also consistent. As shown in Figures 3 to 5, the
values of the up to 29 cohort shifted steadily supporting the LGBT community. On the other
hand, the values of the 50 and above cohort were slower to change and had the highest level
of “Low” responses in 2020.
Discussion
As shown by the included figures, Figures. 2 to 5, the levels of acceptance for the
LGBT community increased over time in Japan. Additionally, Figures 3 to 5 confirm
Inglehart’s generational replacement theory. In Figures 3 and 5, the up to 29 cohort
consistently held the highest acceptance of the LGBT community while the over 50 cohort
held the lowest percentage of acceptance. However, in Figure 4, the 50 and over cohort were
most likely to have answered that they held “Medium” support of the LGBT community, also
supporting Inglehart’s generational replacement and value change theories. Thus, it is evident
that from 1981 to 2020 there was a shift to support the LGBT community which was likely
caused by Inglehart’s generational replacement theory and an emphasis on Post-Materialist
values.
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Perception of Traditional Gender Roles in Japan from 1984 to 2020
World Economic Forums Gender Gap Report (GGR) (World Economic Forum 2021)
measures gender parity across 153 nations that focuses on economic participation and
opportunity, health and survival, educational attainment, and political empowerment;
however, this research focused on the latter two categories as they relate to the WVS survey
questions in this section. In the 2021 report, Japan placed 119th overall, while the nation was
92nd in educational attainment and 147th in political empowerment. In comparison, in the
initial 2006 GGR report, Japan placed 79th overall (out of 115 nations), 60th in educational
attainment, and 83rd in political empowerment. Japan’s GGR placements are graphed in
Figure 1; thus, when considering the number of countries included in the 2006 and 2021
reports, Japan’s placement in the 2021 GGR (World Economic Forum 2021), has not
improved in a considerable amount. Using a combination of GGR (2021) and WVS (2020)
data, the change in gender roles attitudes will be analyzed by looking at views toward
political leaders’ gender and educational data.
World Values Survey (WVS) and Gender Role Perception in Japan
Although the initial WVS survey occurred in 1984 in Japan, questions that pertained
directly to traditional gender roles were not asked until Wave 3 in 1995. The WVS collected
data pertaining to traditional gender roles in Japan in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2019,
respectively called Waves 3 through 7. From Wave 3 (1995) to Wave 5 (2005), respondents
were asked "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do," and “A
university education is more important for a boy than for a girl" (WVS 2020). Respondents
were asked to measure their support or opposition for the aforementioned questions with
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“Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree.” The questions were
analyzed in Figures 6 to 11, with respondents’ answers “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” into
one category, while the “Disagree” and “Strongly Disagree” were grouped into another.
According to Figure 6, in 1995, about 60% of respondents answered “Agree” to the
question. “Men make better political leaders than women.” However, in the same year, 40%
of respondents answered “Disagree”. In the latest wave in 2019, 29% answered “Agree,”
while 71% chose to “Disagree.” Thus, Figure 6 shows that there was an over 30% decrease in
responses that held traditional gender role ideas pertaining to political leader’s gender
between 1995 and 2019, which supports Inglehart’s Post-Materialist theory. Additionally,
when analyzing respondents answers by age cohort (under 29, 30-49, and 50 and above) in
Figures.7 and 8, the results are consistent with Inglehart’s generational replacement theory.
The under 29 cohort held the highest percentage of "Degree” answers; conversely, the above
50 cohort was more likely to answer “Agree” to the statement supporting traditional gender
roles.
In Figure 9 respondents were asked if, “A university education is more important for
a boy than for a girl.” In 1995, 38% of respondents answered “Agree,” and 63% answered,
“Disagree.” In 2019, only 15% of respondents agreed, and 86% disagreed. Once again, it
seems that Inglehart’s Post-Materialist theory is supported as the number of respondents that
held traditional gender role ideals toward education decreased by over 50%. However, when
respondent’s answers were analyzed by age cohort, the results were consistent with
Inglehart’s generational replacement theory from waves 3 to 6. From WVS wave 6 to 7 the
age cohort effect disappeared, and the three cohorts (up to 29, 30-49, 50 and above) held
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similar percentages of “Agree”, “Strongly Agree”, “Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”
answers. with the under 29 cohort holding the highest percentage of “Disagree” responses
followed by the between 30 to 49 cohort and lastly the above 50 cohort, as seen in Figures 10
And 11.
Discussion
The data presented in Figures 7 through 12 confirmed Inglehart’s (1971) PostMaterialist hypothesis. From 1984 to 2020, Japanese attitudes toward traditional gender roles
in education and politics shifted over time toward valuing gender equality. Additionally,
when respondents’ answers were analyzed by age cohort, the results were consistent as the
50 and above cohort typically agreed with traditional gender role ideas surrounding political
leaders and the up to 29 cohort disagreed. Conversely, when analyzing traditional gender
roles in education, respondents’ answers were consistent with Inglehart’s generational
replacement theory from 1995 to 2014 (waves 3 to 6). After wave 6, the age cohort effects
disappeared. Thus, from 1984 to 2020 it is evident that there was a shift to support gender
equality in education and politics through an emphasis on Post-Materialist values. However,
it is likely that only views toward political leader’s geder were affected by Inglehart’s
generational replacement theory, which draws into question the effect of Materialist views on
the importance of education to gender equality.
Although Japan's GGR (2021) ranking was of the lowest regionally and globally, the
2021 GGR stated that Japan made slight progress in political empowerment by electing more
female parliamentarians. Despite this, Japan has yet to elect a female head of government.
On the other hand, the GGR (2021) also reported that Japan closed the gender gap in primary
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education and 95% of the gap in secondary and tertiary education. Thus, Japan's low ranking
on the 2021 Gender Gap Report, combined with the evidence from the selected WVS
questions, supports the notion that despite the changing views toward gender roles in Japan,
policy toward closing the gender gap is stagnant.
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Hokkaido Ainu Living Conditions Survey from 1999 to 2017
The Hokkaido Office of Ainu Measures Promotion conducted the initial Actual
Living Conditions of the Hokkaido Ainu Survey in 1972. Since the first survey, the Office of
Ainu Measures Promotion has administered the Ainu Living Conditions Survey an additional
seven times, in 1979, 1986, 1993, 1999, 2006, 2013, and 2017 respectively. However, only
the data from the 1999 to 2017 iterations were available on the Hokkaido governmental
website on questions related to Ainu discrimination. Despite this, the 2017 survey included a
table of total Ainu participants over all the survey iterations, shown in Table 3. Thus, the
following analyses focuses on the available data to analyze the level of experienced
discrimination of the Hokkaido Ainu population while considering the number of Ainu
surveyed over all survey iterations.
The initial 1972 Ainu Living Conditions survey included 18,298 Ainu (Office of
Ainu Measures Promotion 1972). Over the next two survey iterations in 1979 and 1986, the
number of Ainu surveyed rose to 24,160 and 24,381 respectively (Office of Ainu Measures
Promotion 1979; 1986). However, after the 1986 survey, the number of people surveyed
steadily dropped, with the latest 2017 survey dropping to 13,118 participants, as shown in
Table 3 (Office of Ainu Measures Promotion 2017). The decrease in survey participants may
be due to the limited survey to solely Hokkaido Ainu in ancestral communities or Ainu ties
by marriage, adoption, or descent.
Table 4 detailed the levels of discrimination experienced by Ainu in the last four
survey iterations. Participants were asked if they or an acquaintance had ever experienced
Ainu discrimination. In the 1999 survey 12.4% of respondents answered that they had
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experienced discrimination (Office of Ainu Measures Promotion 1999). On the other hand, in
the 2006, 2013, and 2017 survey years, 16.8%, 23.4%, and 23.2%, respectively, answered
that they experienced discrimination (Office of Ainu Measures Promotion 2006; 2013; 2017).
The aforementioned increase in Ainu discrimination could be caused by ignorance about the
group and backlash against the Ainu and awareness heritage movement. The survey also
included an answer that participants had not personally experienced discrimination but knew
someone who had, to which 15.7% in the 1999 survey chose (Office of Ainu Measures
Promotion 1999). 13.8%, 9.6%, and 13.1% also chose this option in the 2006, 2013, and
2017 survey years, showing a slight drop then subsequent rise in Ainu discrimination (Office
of Ainu Measures Promotion 2006; 2013; 2017). Overall, despite the number of Ainu being
surveyed dropping steadily the levels of discrimination against the group rose over the four
survey iterations, which may be caused by backlash against the Ainu movement or
ignorance. Overall, there is not enough empirical evidence to support or disprove Inglehart’s
Post-materialist shift nor generational replacement theory in Japanese views toward the Ainu.
Contemporary Ainu Rights
In 2019, the most recent Ainu policy called the Act on the Promotion of Measures to
Realize a Society That Will Respect the Pride of the Ainu, or the Ainu Policy Promotion Act
(APP Act), was enacted. The APP Act aimed to create an environment to promote Ainu
culture and publicize public knowledge about Ainu traditions, furthering the goals of the
1997 Act on the Promotion of Ainu Culture, that only promoted the Ainu language, cultural
crafts, and dance (Tsunemoto 2019). The APP Act's articles banned Ainu discrimination,
required federal and local level creation of Ainu education publicity campaigns, and
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allocated 5 billion yen (45 million USD) in grants to 13 municipalities (12 of which are in
Hokkaido) from fiscal years 2019 to 2021 for Ainu tourism, and cultural promotion and
preservation (Tsunemoto 2019; Hokkaido Shimbun 2021; Osakada 2021).
Scholars and Ainu people's opinions on the APP Act are split despite the efforts in the
APP Act to promote Ainu culture and eradicate Ainu discrimination. Some Ainu people have
declared the APP Act significant progress, while others state that it does not address vital
indigenous rights, including self-determination and ancestral land rights (Osakada 2021).
Discussion
Despite creating several laws and governmental organizations to promote awareness
of Ainu culture, much more work is needed on the federal and prefectural level to assist the
Ainu. The Hokkaido Ainu surveys were informational into the status of the Ainu but also
limited as they only gave information to the self-identified Ainu solely within the Hokkaido
prefecture. The Hokkaido Prefectural Government deemed a person Ainu by living in
ancestral communities or descendants by marriage or adoption. This limitation ignored those
who may be unaware of Ainu heritage and Ainu outside the Hokkaido prefecture. Also,
although APP Act made efforts to strengthen public understanding and support of the Ainu, it
did not create a robust framework for eradicating Ainu discrimination, subsequently causing
the Ainu people who wished to utilize the grants for cultural projects to shy away from the
subsidy out of fear of hate speech and criticism (Hokkaido Shimbun 2021). Finally, the APP
Act does not address the assimilationist history nor the Ainu's ancestral lands that were
confiscated and redistributed. Thus, for future policies to be more effective for the
contemporary Ainu, there must be more proactive policies created that address not only
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historical discrimination but also contemporary challenges that the indigenous group faces
today in Japan. Overall, it is difficult to ascertain the change in views toward the Ainu
without data on the Ainu in other prefectures or comprehensive time-series survey data.
However, based upon the data available views toward the Hokkaido Ainu may be backsliding
due to increased prevalence of discrimination; thus, there is not enough evidence to support
or disprove Inglehart’s Post-materialist shift nor generational replacement theory in Japanese
views toward the Ainu.
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Contemporary Presence and Perception of the Hafu
With Japan’s census lacking questions about respondents’ ethnic or racial
background, thorough time-series data relating to the presence and acceptance of multiracial
Japanese is lacking within the nation. Additionally, the WVS (2020) also lacks questions
relating the respondent’s ethnicity in the Japanese iteration of the survey, despite posing
ethnicity-related questions in over 50 other nations surveyed. However, the Ministry of
Health, Labour, and Welfare’s (2020) “Vital Statistics of Japan” documented the nationality
of a child parents within the live birth category, thus providing time-series data related to the
births of multiracial Japanese children or Hafu.
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare Vital Statistics
The Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare’s (2020) Vital Statistics has recorded
various statistics including live births, mortality, and life expectancy within Japan since
1947. However, the nationality of a child’s parents was not represented within the statistics
from 1947 to 1986. Additionally, the 1950 Japanese Nationality Law decreed that a child
could obtain only if their father was a Japanese national; however, a 1984 amendment added
Japanese nationality by birth to a Japanese mother to the Nationality Law (Murazumi 2000).
Since the adoption of the 1984 amendment to the 1950 Japanese Nationality Law, the
presence of multiracial Japanese children due to the new legal considerations. Thus, Table 5
includes the Vital Statistics for the total live births, live births where one parent is nonJapanese, and the percentage of multiracial children born from 1987 to 2020. Notably, in
1987 (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2020), there was 1,346,658 total live births,
with 10,022 being to one non-Japanese parent; thus, only 0.7% of the children born were
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multiracial Japanese children, Compared to 2020 (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare
2020), there was 840,835 total live births and 16,807 children were born to one non-Japanese
parents; consequently, the percentage of multiracial Japanese children born rose to 2%. Thus,
since 1987 there has been a sharp increase in the presence of Hafu or Multiracial Japanese
children born within Japan; however, without relevant and comprehensive time-series data on
the discrimination toward the Hafu it is difficult to confirm Inglehart’s theories.
Hafu as a “Visible” Minority
Takeshita (2020) discussed the concept of “passing” in relation to the multiracial
Japanese community. Takeshita (2020) stated that, “passing refers to the process whereby a
person of one race, gender, nationality, religion, or sexual orientation adopts the guise of
another,” which typically allowed a person to escape the oppression of one identity to gain to
privilege of another. Takeshita’s (2020) study included 139 multiracial Japanese families that
were interviewed on the concepts of passing as “visible” and “invisible” minorities. Notably,
multiracial Japanese children that were considered “visible” minorities by their phenotypical
differences, were more likely to experience incidents of racialized bullying and considered as
non-Japanese (Takeshita 2020). On the other hand, “Invisible” minorities or multiracial
Japanese able to “pass” as Japanese were able to avoid the aforementioned stigma and
bullying (Takeshita 2020). Thus, despite the increased number of multiracial Japanese
children born, discrimination based upon phenotypical differences persists.
Discussion
Due to the lack of substantial time series data relating to the acceptance of the Hafu
community in Japan, it is difficult to surmise the intergenerational change in Japanese views
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toward the group. However, based upon the qualitative studies available, views toward the
multiracial community may be backsliding despite the increase in prevalence of multiracial
Japanese individuals. Thus, additional studies are necessary that focus on multiracial
ethnicity and the perception of phenotypically non-Japanese or “Visible Minorities” within
Japan. Additionally, as participants’ ethnicity is not counted on many Japanese surveys and
the census data is strictly divided into non-Japanese and Japanese, the idea that Japan is a
solely homogenous country lacking ethnic diversity be eradicated at the federal level. Thus,
there is not enough evidence to support or disprove Inglehart’s Post-materialist shift nor
generational replacement theory in Japanese views toward the Hafu or Multiracial Japanese
community.
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Conclusion and Further Research
With literature spanning five decades, Inglehart's Materialist and Post-Materialist
hypotheses are well-researched notions with a solid theoretical basis. As the database for
Inglehart and his colleagues' survey data, the World Values Survey was a crucial source for
interpreting Inglehart's theories. This thesis was necessary to surmise the applicability of
Inglehart's Materialist and Post-Materialist Hypotheses within the context of contemporary
Japan. Despite a host of published scholarly articles testing Inglehart's cohort replacement
theory and value change in Japan, this thesis moves beyond the current literature and focused
specifically on views toward the Ainu, Hafu, women and the LGBT community. Also, as
these underrepresented groups have recently gained traction and increased media
representation within Japan, a thorough study of value change theory toward these
aforementioned groups is essential to add to the current literature.
As evident within the Methodology section, there has been positive progress in views
toward the LGBT community and women. Despite the lack of evident policy changes within
the Gender Gap Report, the prevalence of traditional gender role ideals has shifted
dramatically, while the support for the LGBT community has risen greatly. However, the
applicability of Inglehart’s cohort replacement to gender equitable attitudes surrounding
education can be questioned as the cohort effects lessened in the latest WVS (2020) wave.
On the other hand, through qualitative and quantitative analyses of the Ainu and Multiracial
Japanese community the views toward the groups may be backsliding. Thus, this thesis found
that Inglehart’s Post-materialist shift and generational replacement theories were supported
by the changing views toward traditional gender roles in politics and the LGBT community;
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but generational replacement theory was not supported in traditional gender role views in
education. Finally, there was a lack of evidence to support the Inglehart’s theories when
considering the views toward the Ainu and Hafu. Future studies that consider the effects of
major historical events such as the Lost Decades and Tohoku Earthquake on Post-Materialist
and Materialist values in Japan, may allow more clarity into value change theory in Japan.
Limitations
Limitations to this thesis included the lack of data in the WVS pertaining to ethnicity
of survey participants in Japan, as well as specific questions relating to the Ainu and Hafu.
Additionally, as Japan is viewed on the federal level as a monoethnic society, questions
relating to ethnicity are typically not asked in the federal census data, which further limited
the analysis of the multiethnic Japanese population. Thus, this thesis was limited in its
analysis of ethnic minorities due to the lack of relevant and comprehensive time-series data
on the Ainu and the Multiracial Japanese community.

36

References
Akabayashi, Hideo, Kayo Nozaki, Shiho Yukawa, and Wangyang Li. 2020. “Gender
Differences in Educational Outcomes and the Effect of Family Background: A
Comparative Perspective from East Asia”. Chinese Journal of Sociology 6 (2): 315–
35.
Dalton, Emma. 2017. “Sexual Harassment of Women Politicians in Japan”. Journal of
Gender-Based Violence 1 (2): 205–19.
Doi, Kanae, and Kyle Knight. 2019. “A Silver Lining in Japan's Supreme Court Transgender
Ruling.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/01/silver-liningjapans-supreme-court-transgender-ruling#.
Human Rights Watch. 2019. “A Really High Hurdle: Japan's Abusive Transgender Legal
Recognition Process.” Human Rights Watch.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/19/really-high-hurdle/japans-abusivetransgender-legal-recognition-process.
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “Japan: Pass Equality Act Before Olympics.” Human Rights
Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/25/japan-pass-equality-act-olympics.
Ike, Nobutaka. 1973. “Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan.” American
Political Science Review 67 (4): 1194–1203.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy The Human Development Sequence. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press

37

Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round
One - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.3
Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round
Two - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.4
Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round
Three - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.5
Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round
Four - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.6
Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round
Five - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.7
Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round

38

Six - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.8
Inglehart, Ronald, Christian W. Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya
Kizilova, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Marta Lagos et al. 2018. World Values Survey: Round
Seven - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain, and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems &
WVSA Secretariat. https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.1
Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Postindustrial Societies.” American Political Science Review 65 (4): 991–1017.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1981. "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity." American
Political Science Review 75 (4): 880-900.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Iwabuchi, Koichi. 2014. “Critical Mixed Race Studies and Japanese Experiences.” Journal of
Intercultural Studies 35 (6): 621–26.
Kimura, Keisuke. 2020. “Voices of Invisible Minority: Homogenizing Discourse of
Japaneseness in Hafu: The Mixed-race Experience in Japan.” Journal of Intercultural
Communication Research 50 (3): 1–19.
Library of Congress. 2008. “Japan: Official Recognition of Ainu as Indigenous People.”
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2008-09-05/japan-officialrecognition-of-ainu-as-indigeneous-people/.

39

Library of Congress. 2019. “Japan: New Ainu Law Becomes Effective.”
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2019-08-05/japan-new-ainu-lawbecomes-effective/
Liddicoat, Anthony J. 2007. “Internationalising Japan: Nihonjinron and the Intercultural in
Japanese Language-in-education Policy.” Journal of Multicultural Discourses 2 (1):
32–46.
Lincoln, Edward J. 2020. “A Retrospective on Abenomics.” Center on Japanese Economy
and Business. 378: 1–13.
Mclelland, Mark, and Katsuhiko Suganuma. 2009. “Sexual Minorities and Human Rights in
Japan: An Historical Perspective.” The International Journal of Human Rights 13 (23): 329–43.
Mclelland, Mark. 2004. “From the Stage to the Clinic: Changing Transgender Identities in
Post-war Japan.” Japan Forum 16 (1): 1–20.
Michaud, Matthews. 2015. Settlement into Hokkaido and its Effect on the Environment and
the Ainu People. Kwansei Gakuin University Social Sciences Review 20: 1-9.
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143638579.pdf
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. 2020. Vital Statistics of Japan 2020. https://www.estat.go.jp/en/statsearch/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00450011&kikan=00450&tstat=00000
1028897&cycle=7&year=20200&month=0&tclass1=000001053058&tclass2=00000

40

1053061&tclass3=000001053064&stat_infid=000032118559&result_back=1&cycle
_facet=tclass1%3Atclass2%3Atclass3&tclass4val=0.
Murazumi, Mie. 2000. “Japan’s Laws on Dual Nationality in the Context of a Globalized
World.” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association. 415-43.
Office of Ainu Measures Promotion. 1999. アイヌ政策推進局アイヌ政策課。「平成１１
年 北海道ウタリ生活実態調査報告書」。
https://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/ass/new_jittai.html
Office of Ainu Measures Promotion. 2006. アイヌ政策推進局アイヌ政策課。「平成１８
年 北海道アイヌ生活実態調査報告書」。
https://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/ass/new_jittai.html
Office of Ainu Measures Promotion. 2013. アイヌ政策推進局アイヌ政策課。「平成２５
年 北海道アイヌ生活実態調査報告書」。
https://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/ass/new_jittai.html
Office of Ainu Measures Promotion. 2017. アイヌ政策推進局アイヌ政策課。「平成２９
年 北海道アイヌ生活実態調査報告書」。
https://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/ass/new_jittai.html
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2020. "Gender wage gap".
https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-wage-gap.htm

41

Takenoshita, Hirohisa. 2020. “The Gender Wage Gap in Four Asian Countries: Japan,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.” In Low Fertility in Advanced Asian
Economies. Matsuda, Shigeki. New York: Springer, 41-59.
Takeshita, Shuko. 2020. “Mixed Children in Japan: From the Perspective of Passing.” Asian
Ethnicity 21 (2): 320–36.
Taniguchi, Masaki. 2006. “A Time Machine: New Evidence of Post Materialist Value.”
International Political Science Review 27 (4): 405-425.
Törngren, Sayaka O., and Yuna Sato. 2019. “Beyond Being Either-or: Identification of
Multiracial and Multiethnic Japanese.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 50
(3): 1–19.
Trommsdorff, Gisela. 1983. “Value Change in Japan.” International Journal of Intercultural
Relations 7 (4): 337–60.
Tsunemoto, Teruki. 2019. Overview of the Ainu Policy Promotion Act of 2019. Foreign
Press Center Japan. https://fpcj.jp/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/b8102b519c7b7c4a4e129763f23ed690.pdf
University of Minnesota: Human Rights Library. 2021. Law for the Promotion of the Ainu
Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu and
the Ainu Culture (Law No. 52, May 14, 1997 Amendment: Law No. 160, Dec. 22,
1999). http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/law-ainu.html

42

World Economic Forum. 2006. “Global Gender Gap Report 2006.”
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2006.pdf
World Economic Forum. 2020. “Global Gender Gap Report 2020.”
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf
World Economic Forum. 2021. “Global Gender Gap Report 2021.”
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf
World Health Organization. 2020. “Global Abortion Policies Database.” https://abortionpolicies.srhr.org/country/japan/.
Yamaguchi, Kazuo. 2019. “Japan's Gender Gap.” Finance & Development 56 (1): 26-29.
Yamashiro, Jane H. 2013. “The Social Construction of Race and Minorities in
Japan.” Sociology Compass 7 (2): 147–61.

43

Tables and Figures
Tables
Table 1. Materialist and Post-Materialist Value Systems

Materialism

Post-Materialism

1. Politics

1. Politics

Need for Strong Leaders

De-emphasis on Political Authority

Order

Self-expression

Xenophobia
2. Economics

2. Economics

Priority to economic growth

Quality of life has top priority

Individual versus state ownership

Diminishing authority of both private and state
ownership

3. Sexual/Family Norms

3. Sexual/Family Norms

Sexual and Family norms

Emphasis on Individual self-expression and

Maximize reproduction, but only in a two-

freedom of sexual/gender identity

parent heterosexual family
4. Religion

4. Religion

Emphasis on a higher power (religion)

Diminishing religious authority

Absolute Rulers

Emphasis on the meaning and purpose of life

Source: Based on Taniguchi (2006), Inglehart (1997)
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Table 2. Materialist and Post-Materialist Value Systems: Illustration of the 12-Item Battery in the World Values System

The most important aim of this country for the next 10 years is…?
1. Maintaining a high level of economic growth (Materialism)
2. Making sure the country has a strong defense force (Materialism)
3. Maintaining order in the nation (Materialism)
4. A Stable Economy (Materialism)
5. Fighting Rising Prices (Materialism)
6. The Fight Against Crime (Materialism)
7. Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in
their communities (Post-Materialism)
8. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful (Post-Materialism)
9. Giving more people say in government decisions (Post-Materialism)
10. Protecting freedom of speech (Post-Materialism)
11. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society (Post-Materialism)
12. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money (PostMaterialism)

Source: Based on Taniguchi (2006), Inglehart (1997)
Table 3. Hokkaido Ainu Survey

Year

Hokkaido Ainu Surveyed

1972

18,298

1979

24,160
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1986

24,381

1993

23,830

1999

23,767

2006

23,782

2013

16,786

2017

13,118
Source: Survey on Actual Ainu Conditions
Table 4. Ainu Discrimination Figures

Year

Have you experienced

Acquaintance has

discrimination?

experienced
discrimination

1999

12.4%

15.7%

2006

16.8%

13.8%

2013

23.4%

9.6%

2017

23.3%

13.1%

Source: Survey on Actual Ainu Conditions
Table 5. Total Live Births in Japan from 1987 to 2020

Year

Total Live Births

Total Live Births

Percentage %

(One parent is non-

of Multiracial

Japanese)

Births

1987

1,346,658

10,022

0.7%

1990

1,221,585

13,686

1.1%
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1995

1,187,064

20,254

1.7%

1996

1,206,555

21,064

1.7%

1997

1,191,665

21,525

1.8%

1998

1,203,147

22,021

1.8%

1999

1,177,669

21,464

1.8%

2000

1,190,547

22,337

1.9%

2001

1,170,662

22,176

1.9%

2002

1,153,855

22,251

1.9%

2003

1,123,610

21,522

1.9%

2004

1,110,721

22,173

2%

2005

1,062,530

21,873

2.1%

2006

1,092,674

23,463

2.1%

2007

1,089,818

24,177

2.2%

2008

1,091,156

23,956

2.2%

2009

1,070,036

22,511

2.1%

2010

1,071,305

21,966

2.1%

2011

1,050,807

20,311

1.9%

2012

1,037,232

20,536

2%

2013

1,029,817

19,532

1.9%

2014

1,003,609

19,649

2%

2015

1,005,721

19,079

1.9%
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2016

977,242

19,124

2%

2017

946,146

18,135

1.9%

2018

918,400

17,878

1.9%

2019

865,239

17,403

2%

2020

840,835

16,807

2%

Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare
Figures
Figure 1. Japan’s Global Gender Gap Placement 2006-2021
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Figure 2. World Values Survey Acceptance of Homosexuality (%) in Japan (1981-2020)

Acceptance of Homosexuality (%)
80

72%

70
60

55%

50
40
30
20
10

17%

4%

0
1981-84

1989-94

1995-98
High

1999-04
Medium

2005-09

2010-14

2017-20

Low

Figure 3. Age Cohort “Low” Acceptance of Homosexuality (%) in Japan (1981-2020)
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Figure 4. Age Cohort “Medium” Acceptance of Homosexuality (%) in Japan (1981-2020)
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Figure 5. Age Cohort “High” Acceptance of Homosexuality (%) in Japan (1981-2020)
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Figure 6. University is more important for boys than girls (%)
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Figure 7. Men make better political leaders than women (%) “Agree” grouped by age cohorts
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Figure 8. Men make better political leaders than women (%) “Disagree” grouped by age cohorts
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Figure 9. University is more important for boys than girls (%)
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Figure 10. University is more important for boys than girls (%) “Agree” grouped by age cohorts
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Figure 11. University is more important for boys than girls (%) “Disagree” grouped by age cohorts
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